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Global competition and escalating customer expec-
tations have led manufacturers to increasingly focus on
delivery speed, dependability and flexibility (Boyer and
Lewis, 2002; Flynn and Flynn, 2004). To enhance these
capabilities, many companies have implemented supply
chain integration (SCI) strategies (Bowersox et al.,
1999). The literature has cited the importance of SCI in
achieving a competitive advantage (Bowersox and
Morash, 1989; Lee and Billington, 1992; Morris and
X. Zhao et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 368–388 369
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework.Calantone, 1991) and enhancing performance (Ahmad
and Schroeder, 2001; Frohlich and Westbrook, 2001;
Johnson, 1999; Narasimhan and Jayaram, 1998; Stank
et al., 2001a; Zhao et al., 2006b). However, our
understanding of what enables SCI is still very limited.
Although marketing researchers have studied factors
that influence inter-firm relationships from the per-
spective of power and relationship commitment
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Brown et al., 1995), this
perspective has not been applied in a SCI context.
This relationship is of particular interest in China,
whose dynamic competitive environment provides fertile
ground for investigating power, relationship commitment
and their impact on SCI. China has become a very
important manufacturing base in the world, with annual
GDP growth averaging around 10% for the last 15 years
and the manufacturing component accounts for more
than one-third of the total GDP (Zhao et al., 2006a).
Because China’s national culture is characterized by high
power distance and collectivism, it is a particularly
interesting location for studying issues related to supply
chain (SC) power and relationship commitment.
Transaction cost theory (TCT) provides a useful lens
for understanding SCI. TCTwas originally introduced by
Coase (1937), who examined the make versus buy
decision faced by organizations. While producing in-
housemay incur higher production costs, buying from the
market incurs higher transactions costs. Williamson
(1975, 1985, 1991, 1993, 1996) proposed four types of
transaction costs: (1) search costs, related to gathering
information to identify and evaluate potential partners;
(2) contracting costs, associated with negotiating and
writing an agreement; (3) monitoring costs, associated
with ensuring that each party fulfills its obligations; (4)
enforcement costs, associated with ex post bargaining
and sanctioning of a partner that does not perform
according to the agreement. TCT uses the tradeoff
between production costs and transaction costs to explain
how organizations make make-or-buy decisions.
SCI provides an alternative which lowers the
transaction costs normally associated with the ‘‘buy’’
alternative, which is relevant to outsourcing. While
production costs are lowered through outsourcing, SCI
also reduces transaction costs through building long-
term relationships and integrating interorganizational
processes. SCI reduces search costs by establishing
long-term relationships with fewer suppliers. Because
the manufacturer has fewer partners and changes them
infrequently, SCI reduces contracting costs by reducing
the cost of negotiating and writing contractual agree-
ments. Because manufacturers share information with
their customers, the time needed for monitoringcompliance with the contract is reduced, reducing
monitoring costs. Finally, by jointly formulating
strategy and working collaboratively, SCI reduces
enforcement costs. Thus, SCI provides a powerful
alternative which allows companies to reap the benefits
of both ‘‘make’’ and ‘‘buy.’’
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between
power, relationship commitment and the integration of
manufacturers with their customers, establishing the
mechanisms of SCI based on the perspectives of power–
relationship commitment theory, social exchange
theory and TCT. Specifically, our objectives are:1. To identify the antecedents of customer integration
and to develop and test an instrument for measuring
them in a SC context.2. Topropose and empirically test amodel that represents
the relationship among customer power, relationship
commitment and customer integration in a SC.3. To justify and develop power–relationship commit-
ment theory in the context of an emerging economy
that has a high power distance and collectivist
national culture.4. To offer guidelines for practicing managers to
enhance their performance through understanding
the role of power in SCI and better management of
customer relationships.
2. Theoretical background and research
hypotheses
We reviewed the multi-disciplinary literature related
to power, relationship commitment and customer
integration, developing the conceptual framework
shown in Fig. 1. In the following sections, we discuss
each of its components and develop hypotheses about
how they are related.
2.1. Customer power
Customer power is the ability of a customer to
influence the decisions of a manufacturer in a SC
(Brown et al., 1983, 1995; Goodman and Dion, 2001).
The more general concept of power has long been an
important topic of study in organizational behavior
(Drea et al., 1993), with French and Raven’s (1959)
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Table 1
Bases of inter-firm power
Type of power Power base Description Supply chain example
Non-mediated Expert power Customer has knowledge,
expertise or skills desired
by the manufacturer
The customer knows what the final consumer wants or has
knowledge and expertise in designing or distributing new
products to the final consumers
Referent power Manufacturer values
identification with
the customer
If the customer has developed a strong bond through its
demonstrated concern, management style and organizational
personality, it has power over the manufacturer, based on
positive emotional ties (Goodman and Dion, 2001)
Legitimate power Manufacturer believes
customer retains natural
right to influence it
The manufacturer believes that the customer has the right to
request and expect things to be done according to its requirements,
as part of the manufacturer–customer relationship. This is a
result of the level of importance accorded the customer
in the supply chain
Mediated Reward power Customer has the ability
to mediate rewards to
manufacturer
The customer has the ability to provide rewards that are attractive to
the manufacturer, for example, the customer can decide to give
more business to the manufacturer
Coercive power Customer has the ability
to mediate punishment
to manufacturer
The customer has the ability to provide punishments that are
detrimental to the manufacturer, for example, the customer can cancel
business or reduce the volume of business with the manufacturer
Adapted from Maloni and Benton (2000, p. 54).seminal work classifying power into five sources
holding up to extensive empirical testing for almost
50 years (Rabin et al., 2001). Table 1 provides a
definition and SC example of each of the sources of
power. While some function as a ‘‘carrot,’’ attracting
manufacturers without the customer taking any explicit
action, others function as a ‘‘stick’’ wielded by
customers to ensure manufacturer compliance. These
are known as non-mediated and mediated sources of
power, respectively (Tedeschi et al., 1972).
Reward and coercive power are considered mediated
because their use is controlled by the customer, which
can reward a manufacturer by creating positive
consequences, such as placing customer orders (Reza-
boklah et al., 2006), or coerce it through negative
consequences, such as canceling an order. The
customer, as the source of the power, decides whether,
when and how to use its power to influence the
manufacturer’s behavior. In contrast, expert, referent
and legitimate power are considered non-mediated,
because the manufacturer, itself, decides whether and
how much it will be influenced by a customer. The
manufacturer seeks association with a customer
because of its perception of the customer’s knowledge
or expertise (expert power), reputation (referent power)
or its belief that the customer has the natural right to
influence it (legitimate power).
National culture may play an important role in SC
power. In a high power distance national culture like
China, there is an acceptance of power inequalities
(Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Wang and Clegg, 2002). In fact,people expect decisions to be made by the more
powerful party and may not feel comfortable otherwise
(Randolph and Sashkin, 2002). Because non-mediated
power is based on the perception of the source’s power,
rather than on its exercise, we expect that expert,
referent and legitimate power will be strong in China’s
high power distance national culture, where perceived
differences in power are taken very seriously. In
addition, members of high power distance national
cultures are more willing to accept the use of coercive
and reward power (Wang and Clegg, 2002). Because the
use of power needs less legitimization in a high power
distance national culture (Hofstede et al., 2002), it is
reasonable to believe that the effects of both mediated
and non-mediated sources of power will be stronger in
China than in Western societies.
Guanxi, which is a behavioral outgrowth of China’s
cultural values, is the granting of preferential treatment
to business partners, in exchange for favors and
obligations (Lee et al., 2001). It is a morally binding
social norm that a favor should be reciprocated as soon
as the opportunity arises (Lee and Dawes, 2005). Not
returning a favor results in loss of face for both the
manager and his in-group. Because guanxi is based on
the expectation of reciprocity, we expect that reward
power will be particularly strong in China.
2.2. Relationship commitment
Relationship commitment is the willingness of a
party to invest financial, physical or relationship-based
X. Zhao et al. / Journal of Operations Management 26 (2008) 368–388 371resources in a relationship (Morgan andHunt, 1994). In
a SC, it is an attitude of SC partners about the
development and maintenance of a stable, long-lasting
mutual relationship (Anderson and Weitz, 1992;
Moore, 1998). From the perspective of TCT, relation-
ship commitment can be viewed as an investment in
transaction-specific assets, which are difficult or
impossible to redeploy when a relationship is termi-
nated (Heide, 1994; Joshi and Stump, 1999). For
example, relocation of a manufacturer’s facility to be
in physical proximity of a customer is an investment in
a transaction-specific asset because it cannot be
redeployed to a different customer if the original
relationship is terminated. Other examples of transac-
tion-specific assets include customer-specific training
of a manufacturer’s personnel, modification of internal
manufacturing processes to accommodate a specific
customer’s product, exchange of personnel, direct
capital investments (Carr and Pearson, 1999), and
information systems, such as networks, quick ordering
systems and point of sale systems for leading
customers.
Relationship commitment can be classified as
normative or instrumental (Brown et al., 1995).
Normative relationship commitment is a mutual,
ongoing relationship over an extended period of time
which is based on mutual commitment and sharing
(Ellram, 1991). At the heart of normative relationship
commitment is trust (LaLonde and Cooper, 1989),
which is the belief that a partner will not act
opportunistically (Anderson and Narus, 1990). Instru-
mental relationship commitment, in contrast, is based
on compliance (Brown et al., 1995). Compliance occurs
when one party accepts the influence of another in hopes
of receiving favorable reactions from the other party.
Because TCT underestimates the role of social
interactions, such as relationship commitment (Ghoshal
and Moran, 1996; Granovetter, 1985; Hill, 1990;
Atuahene-Gima and Li, 2002), we call upon social
exchange theory, which is driven by the central concept
of exchanging resources via a relationship exchange. It
suggests that the behavior of a company in a transaction
cannot be explained solely by economic factors, but
should also be explained by social factors including
repeated exchanges, future obligations and the belief
that each party will fulfill its obligations (Blau, 1964;
Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). This is particularly relevant
in China’s collectivist national culture, where guanxi
creates obligations in business relationships. From the
perspective of social exchange theory, power, trust and
relationship commitment play an important role in SC
relationships.2.2.1. Relationship between customer power and
normative relationship commitment
Relationship commitment is built upon the construct
of loyalty, which is a propensity to transact, resulting in
sequential purchase or proportionality (Fournier, 1998).
Rather than increasing the extent of hierarchical control
to protect transaction-specific assets from opportunistic
appropriation, SC partners in a committed relationship
engage in relational governance, including investment
in transaction-specific assets and a high level of
organizational trust. Thus, the motive for exchange
relationships departs from purely economic and is
overlaid with a social context that carries strong
expectations of trust and the absence of opportunism
(Zaheer and Venkataraman, 1995).
China’s cultural collectivism lays the foundation for
normative relationship commitment, where group
interests dominate. In fact, the Chinese tradition has
no equivalent to the Western concept of self as a
separate entity, distinct from society and culture
(Etzioni, 1975). Members of collective cultures readily
subordinate their personal goals to those of the group
(Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Briley and Wyer, 2002) and
place the interests of the collective above their own
(Chow et al., 2000). The essence of a collective culture
is a constant concern for belongingness, dependency
and reciprocity (Griffith et al., 2006). Thus, normative
relationship commitment may be easier to develop in
China, since members of its highly collective culture
experience relatedness with others as a fundamental
part of themselves (Eaton and Louw, 2000). The
perception of non-mediated power sources enhances
attitudes towards SC relationships, fostering congru-
ence in values and norms between members (Frazier
and Summers, 1986). Jonsson and Ziveldin (2003)
found that non-mediated sources of power increased the
value of a relationship by increasing the level of
effective cooperation, consistent with the notion of
normative relationship commitment.
Expert power in a SC is commitment to customers
that possess knowledge, skills or expertise that they
believe will be beneficial to them (French and Raven,
1959). For example, by providing its suppliers with Six
Sigma training and helping them get started with their
own projects, manufacturers learn valuable skills from
Cummins Engine. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1a. A manufacturer’s normative relationship com-
mitment will be positively related to its perception of
the expert power of its customer.
Referent power is related to an organization’s
identification with and internalization of the goals
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Wetzels et al., 1998). Identification occurs when a
manufacturer accepts a customer’s influence because it
admires the way the customer manages its business and
wants to establish a relationship with it. For example,
many manufacturers proudly display plaques indicating
that they are preferred suppliers to leading companies.
Internalization occurs when a manufacturer accepts a
customer’s influence because it holds values and norms
of behavior that are similar (Brown et al., 1995).
Identification and internalization may be especially
potent in China, where power is transferred through the
extended guanxi network (Zhuang and Zhou, 2004).
Therefore,
H1b. A manufacturer’s normative relationship com-
mitment will be positively related to its perception of
the referent power of its customer.
When a manufacturer believes that its customer has
the legitimate right to influence it and that it is obligated
to accept that influence (Rezaboklah et al., 2006), the
manufacturer has legitimized the customer’s influence.
Because of its perception of legitimate power, the
manufacturer does not question actions taken by the
customer, it simply complies. For example, state-owned
manufacturing enterprises in China were historically
provided with production schedules by the central
government. Despite the fact that these production
schedules were frequently out of synch with market
demand, they were not questioned, because the central
government was believed to have the natural right to
determine the policies and practices of state-owned
enterprises. Thus, we propose:
H1c. Amanufacturer’s normative relationship commit-
ment will be positively related to its perception of the
legitimate power of its customer.
Empirical findings on the relationship between non-
mediated sources of power and normative relationship
commitment are somewhat mixed in Western-based
research. Geyskens et al. (1999) found that non-
coercive influence strategies had an indirect positive
effect on commitment, while Brown et al. (1995)
reported that manufacturers’ non-mediated sources of
power had a direct effect on retailers’ normative
relationship commitment. While Maloni and Benton
(2000) and Benton and Maloni (2005) found a positive
relationship between both expert and referent power and
normative relationship commitment, legitimate power
was found to be negatively related. Wu et al. (2004)
found a positive relationship between power and
normative relationship commitment.Mediated sources of power are inconsistent with
normative relationship commitment because they are
manipulative by nature. Customers’ exercise of reward
power manipulates the manufacturer through the
provision of rewards for desired behaviors (Rezaboklah
et al., 2006), which flies in the face of the trust that is at
the heart of normative relationship commitment. The
frequent use of mediated power has been shown to
damage relational norms (Skinner et al., 1992),
reducing the strength of a relationship (Benton and
Maloni, 2005; Maloni and Benton, 2000). Referring to
normative relationship commitment, Brown et al.
(1995) stated, ‘‘As these intrinsic factors become
central, extrinsic factors such as rewards and punish-
ments, become less important (p. 368).’’ Therefore, we
expect that the customer’s use of reward power will
decrease normative relationship commitment. Thus,
H1d. A manufacturer’s normative relationship com-
mitment will be negatively related to its perception
of the reward power of its customer.
Similarly, coercive power is exhibited through
customers’ threats to withdraw business unless the
manufacturer engages in desired behaviors, such as
price concessions or quality improvement. For example,
Ford routinely delayed sending payments that were
owed for engines supplied by Navistar, using what it
believed to be its coercive power, in order to force
Navistar to extend longer payment terms. In an
interesting turn of events, however, Navistar shut down
its factories and stopped producing Ford engines,
shifting the coercive power from the customer to the
manufacturer. The situation eventually had to be settled
by a court order, illustrating a clear lack of normative
relationship commitment between Ford and Navistar.
Coercive power exists when the powerful party uses
its resources to harm its SC partner (Kumar et al., 1995,
1998). This is consistent with TCT’s assumption that the
risk of opportunism is inherent in many transactions.
Opportunism is defined as:
‘‘self-interest seeking with guile. This includes but is
scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as lying,
stealing, and cheating. More generally, opportunism
refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of
information, especially to calculated efforts to
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise
confuse’’ (Williamson, 1985, p. 47).
Because SCI requires a manufacturer to invest
specific assets in a relationship, there is the potential for
opportunistic behaviors by its customers (Jap and
Ganesan, 2000; Gundlach et al., 1995). This can
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employs governance mechanisms to safeguard against
opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Opportunism leads
to deterioration in trust and relationship commitment.
For example, a company can send an unmistakable
signal about its readiness to use its capability to
potentially bury a manufacturer with litigation by
simply accumulating potentially damaging legal
resources. The perspective of resource dependence
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) suggests that
asymmetric power relationships between customers
and manufacturers are inherently unstable (Lawler,
1986; Rubin and Brown, 1975). The less dependent
firm has little to lose, little fear of retaliation and few
restraints on its punitive actions. Thus, the manu-
facturer’s expectation of coercion grows as the
customer’s punitive capability increases (Lawler
et al., 1988). Clearly, the use of coercive power is
counter to normative relationship commitment’s goal
of establishing a satisfying relationship between SC
members.
H1e. Amanufacturer’s normative relationship commit-
ment will be negatively related to its perception of the
coercive power of its customer.
Empirical findings on the relationship between
mediated power and normative relationship commit-
ment are quite inconsistent. Although Brown et al.
(1995) and Maloni and Benton (2000) found that
mediated sources of power were negatively related to
normative relationship commitment, Jonsson and
Ziveldin (2003) found that coercive power was non-
significant. Ramaseshan et al. (2006) found that both
coercive power and reward power had a positive effect
on commitment, and Maloni and Benton likewise found
a positive relationship between reward power and
normative relationship commitment. Wong et al.
(2005), however, found that Chinese managers avoided
opportunistic behavior because of the value placed on
interpersonal relationships. Thus, there is a need for
further testing of this relationship.
2.2.2. Relationship between customer power and
instrumental relationship commitment
Because instrumental relationship commitment is
based on calculation of benefits and costs (Brown et al.,
1995) and manipulation, it is expected that expert,
referent and legitimate power will be inversely related
to it. The use of non-mediated sources of power fosters
congruence in values and norms of behavior because the
manufacturer willingly accepts the customer’s influ-
ence. This then decreases its tendency to makecommitments based on calculation of short-term
financial benefits and costs.
H2a. A manufacturer’s instrumental relationship com-
mitment will be negatively related to its perception of
the expert power of its customer.
H2b. A manufacturer’s instrumental relationship com-
mitment will be negatively related to its perception of
the referent power of its customer.
H2c. A manufacturer’s instrumental relationship com-
mitment will be negatively related to its perception of
the legitimate power of its customer.
Because a customer’s reward or coercive power
provides extrinsic motivation for commitment (Brown
et al., 1995), we hypothesize that mediated sources of
power will be positively related to instrumental relation-
ship commitment. This relationship may be especially
potent in China, because of the importance of guanxi,
whose rewards can include access to limited resources
and controlled information, preferential terms for
pricing, contracts andcredit, andprotection fromexternal
competitors (Lee et al., 2001). Because of the obligation
to exchange favors with other members of the network
(Leung et al., 2005), Chinese manufacturers place
substantial weight on the anticipated reaction of
customers. For example, if a purchasing manager places
an order with a member of his guanxi network, the
supplying manager is obligated to respond with a gift,
favor or concession. If the obligation is not fulfilled
within a short amount of time, the guanxi relationship
will become strained and the social harmony between the
managers disturbed, because the supplying manager has
lost face (Lee et al., 2001). Guanxi relationships are
viewed as more reliable than a written contract
(legitimate power) in China (Leung et al., 2005), because
the unreliable Chinese legal system historically made it
difficult to uphold contracts (Wong et al., 2005), and
because of the perception that contracts are used
primarily by foreigners to take advantage of Chinese
organizations. This is consistent with the work of Pearce
(2001a,b) and Rao et al. (2005) on facilitative govern-
ments, which states that, in the presence of a non-
supportive or erratic government, personal relationships
emerge as the most important form of governance.
Therefore, we expect that the use of reward power will
foster stronger instrumental relationship commitment
(Brown et al., 1995; Kasulis and Spekman, 1980).
H2d. A manufacturer’s instrumental relationship com-
mitment will be positively related to its perception of
the reward power of its customer.
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manufacturer to comply with their requirements,
thereby increasing the manufacturer’s instrumental
relationship commitment, and guanxi is related to
coercive power. If there is no guanxi between SC
partners, there is no obligation (Lee and Dawes, 2005).
In fact, Lee et al. (2001) describe a type of guanxi
known as instrumental guanxi, manifest in temporary,
impersonal ties that are based on transactional relation-
ships. They may be of short duration; when the need
ceases to exist, so does the guanxi. In a relationship
without guanxi, Chinese managers will readily exploit
their partners (Wong et al., 2005). The pervasiveness of
guanxi makes the use of coercive power seem natural in
China. Therefore,
H2e. A manufacturer’s instrumental relationship com-
mitment will be positively related to its perception of
the coercive power of its customer.
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Our discussion of customer integration (CI) begins
with the broader construct of SCI. SCI is the degree to
which an organization strategically collaborates with its
SC partners and manages intra- and inter-organization
processes to achieve effective and efficient flows of
products, services, information, money and decisions,
with the objective of providing maximum value to its
customers (Bowersox et al., 1999; Frohlich and
Westbrook, 2001; Naylor et al., 1999). This involves
information sharing, planning, coordinating and con-
trolling materials, parts and finished goods at the
strategic, tactical and operational levels (Stevens,
1989). Benefits arise from managing a SC as a single
system, as opposed to individually optimizing frag-
mented subsystems (Watts and Hahn, 1993; Watts et al.,
1995; Vickery et al., 2003).
Though there is not a commonly agreed framework
for the components of SCI, two primary factors have
been investigated: specific investments and relationship
governance. SCI-specific investments include informa-
tion systems, dedicated employees and other assets
invested in SCI (Power, 2005; Narasimhan and Kim,
2001; Stank et al., 2001a,b; Frohlich and Westbrook,
2001; Zhao et al., 2006b). Examples of SCI relationship
governance include information sharing, strategic
partnerships, collaboration and other approaches for
managing and controlling SCI relationships (Power,
2005; Armistead andMapes, 1993;Morash and Clinton,
1998; Stank et al., 2001a,b; Johnson, 1999; Frohlich and
Westbrook, 2001; Zhao et al., 2006b).There are numerous types of SCI, including strategic,
internal, customer, supplier, information, planning,
measurement and relationship integration (Stank et al.,
2001a), however, there is a great deal of overlap between
these constructs. Customer integration (CI) has been
found to be themost important type of SCI in influencing
competitive performance (Stank et al., 2001a; Zhao et al.,
2006b), thus, we focus on it in this study. CI derives from
coordinationwith critical SC customers (Bowersox et al.,
1999). Information sharing, coordination and synchro-
nization of processes are critical activities in CI.
2.3.1. Relationship between normative relationship
commitment and customer integration
Because CI is built upon SC partnerships (Wisner and
Tan, 2000), relationship commitment plays an important
role, however, few studies have investigated the impact of
relationship commitment on CI from the perspective of
SCM. In addition, much of the prior research fails to
differentiate between normative relationship commit-
ment and instrumental relationship commitment. For
example, Morgan and Hunt (1994) found that relation-
ship commitment positively influenced acquiescence and
cooperation and negatively influenced propensity to
leave, but they did not separate the effects of normative
and instrumental relationship commitment. Chen and
Paulraj (2004) similarly refer to a broad relationship
commitment construct, stating that SC members inte-
grate with their key customers’ business processes and
goals when there is relationship commitment.
TCT and social exchange theory provide an explana-
tion of the mechanisms of normative and instrumental
relationship commitment in improving CI. Normative
relationship commitment leads to stable long-term
relationships, in which opportunistic behaviors are
reduced because they contradict the interests of the
other party (Williamson, 1985). To reduce transaction
costs and opportunistic behaviors, SC partners develop
and enhance normative relationship commitment, where
both partners are willing to communicate and to share
information. From the perspective of social exchange
theory, trust is critical, because it develops from shared
values, which improves communication and under-
standing between SC partners (Atuahene-Gima and Li,
2002), and trust may prevail even where opportunism
might be rationally expected (Atuahene-Gima and Li,
2002), because social exchange theory allows for
trustworthy behaviors even if explicit controls against
opportunism are not in place (Granovetter, 1985). Trust
improves commitment, because it reduces the risk or
opportunistic behavior and thus increases SC partners’
confidence in the effectiveness of future exchanges and
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1998; Ruyter et al., 2001).
Normative relationship commitment reflects the
manufacturer’s willingness to maintain a long-term
relationship with its customer through affective attach-
ment and the identification of and internalization with
the values and norms of the customer. This committed
long-term relationship is based on an orientation toward
repeated transactions and shared values that ensure
future obligation and reduce intention to leave. Thus,
manufacturers with greater normative relationship
commitment are more likely to integrate with their
customers. Thus, we hypothesize:
H3a. The degree of integration between a manufac-
turer and its customer will be positively related to the
manufacturer’s normative relationship commitment.
2.3.2. Relationship between instrumental
relationship commitment and customer integration
There is very little literature on the role of
instrumental relationship commitment in CI. Compa-
nies with instrumental relationship commitment will
likely commit to a relationship only when they can be
rewarded. Instrumental relationship commitment is not
based on shared norms or values, nor is it long-term
oriented. Furthermore, instrumental relationship com-
mitment may lead to opportunistic behavior, since
calculation is the major driver for commitment to a SC
relationship. We propose the following hypothesis:Fig. 2. ProposeH3b. The degree of integration between a manufac-
turer and its customer will be positively related to the
manufacturer’s instrumental relationship commitment.
Hess and Story (2005) describe normative relation-
ship commitment as the ultimate relationship disposi-
tion; although it takes longer to develop than a
transactional relationship, its benefits are more endur-
ing. When SC members cooperate to maintain a
relationship because they believe it is important enough
to warrant the effort, they may be willing to sacrifice
short term benefits, in order to achieve long term gains
(Dwyer et al., 1987; LaLonde and Cooper, 1989). Thus,
normative relationship commitment is stronger than
instrumental relationship commitment, which is trans-
actional, rather than relationship based.
H3c. Normative relationship commitment by the man-
ufacturer will have a stronger impact on customer
integration than instrumental relationship commitment.
An overview of the proposed hypotheses and their
inter-relationship is provided in Fig. 2.
3. Research methodology
3.1. Sampling and data collection
Since China is very large with uneven economic
development across regions (Zhao et al., 2006a), we
strategically selected five cities to provide geographicd model.
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cities with a broad variety of manufacturing activities.
Shanghai represents the Yangtze River Delta, which has
China’s highest GDP per capita. Guang Zhou represents
the Pearl River Delta, which has China’s second highest
GDP per capita. Both are located in eastern and
southern China, which has the highest degree of
marketization and economic reform. Tianjin represents
the Bohai Sea Economic area and reflects an average
level of economic reform and marketization. Chongq-
ing, located in the southwest, represents a relatively
lower stage of economic reform and marketization. We
also included Hong Kong. Although most Hong Kong
companies have their manufacturing facilities in
Mainland China, they operate in quite a different
environment.
To obtain a representative sample, we randomly
selected companies from the yellow pages of China
Telecom for the four mainland cities and from the
directory of the Chinese Manufacturers Association for
Hong Kong. Research assistants called randomly
selected companies to determine the contact informa-
tion for key informants, who were SC managers,
CEOs/presidents, vice presidents in charge of market-
ing and sales managers. We sent the questionnaire to the
key informant, along with a cover letter highlighting the
study’s objectives. Respondents were encouraged to
participate by entitlement to a summary report and a
small incentive gift. Self-addressed, stamped envelopes
were included, and follow-up calls were made to
improve the response rate. Out of the 4569 companies
contacted, a total of 1356 agreed to receive the
questionnaire. After several follow-up calls, 617 usable
questionnaires were received. The response rate, based
on the number of companies contacted, was 13.5%,
however, it was 45.5% based on the number of
questionnaires distributed.
3.2. Questionnaire design
We undertook an intensive study of the literature to
identify existing measures for related constructs. For
constructs which had not been well documented and
tested in the literature, we developed new items based
on our understanding of the constructs, observations
during company visits and interviews with practitioners.
The measures for expert, referent, legitimate, reward
and coercive power were adapted from Brown et al.
(1995). We used a subset of their legitimate power
items, selecting those related to the natural right of a
customer to influence a manufacturer. We did not
include their items designed to measure power based onjudicial or legal right, because our interviews revealed
that it was not a big concern for respondents, since
regulations for economic activities are not well formed.
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their
agreement with statements concerning the use of power
by their primary customer, using a Likert scale where
‘‘1’’ indicates ‘‘strongly disagree’’ and ‘‘7’’ indicates
‘‘strongly agree.’’ The measures for normative and
instrumental relationship commitment were also
adopted from Brown et al. (1995). The measures for
customer integration were selected from those used by
Narasimhan and Kim (2002) and Frohlich and
Westbrook (2001).
The questionnaire was written in English, then
translated into Chinese by an operations management
professor in China. It was then back-translated into
English by a different operations management professor
in Hong Kong and the translation checked against the
original English version for accuracy. The Chinese
version was used in Mainland China, while a bilingual
version was used in Hong Kong. The questionnaire was
pilot tested in a sample of fifteen companies, where we
conducted face-to-face discussions with executives
after they completed the questionnaire. Based on their
feedback, we modified, added or deleted questions,
making them more understandable and relevant to
practices in China.
Since we used a single informant to answer all
questions, we checked for common method bias. The
items comprising the power, relationship commitment
and customer integration scales were not highly similar
in content, and the respondents were familiar with the
constructs. Harman’s one-factor test of common
method bias (Hochwarter et al., 2004; Podsakoff and
Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003) found several
distinct factors for all variables, revealing that common
method variance bias was not a problem.
4. Analysis and results
4.1. Respondent profiles
The responding companies represent a number of
industries, as illustrated in Table 2. Three quarters of the
respondents had been in their position for more than 3
years. Thus, the respondents were familiar with their
companies’ activities, and the data collected from them
should be reliable. Table 3 contains basic information
about the customers. We defined ‘‘primary customer’’
as the customer purchasing the highest dollar volume
from the manufacturer. The mean number of customers
per manufacturer was 177, and half the manufacturers
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Table 2
Company profiles
Industry Total
(n = 617)
Hong Kong
(n = 206)
Guangzhou
(n = 104)
Chongqing
(n = 104)
Shanghai
(n = 100)
Tianjin
(n = 103)
Food, beverage, alcohol
and cigars
30 (4.87%) 12 (5.85%) 6 (5.77%) 5 (4.81%) 1 (1.00%) 6 (5.83%)
Chemicals and petrochemicals 39 (6.33%) 3 (1.46%) 9 (8.65%) 8 (7.69%) 8 (8.00%) 11 (10.68%)
Wood and furniture 12 (1.95%) 2 (0.98%) 4 (3.85%) 2 (1.92%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (3.88%)
Pharmaceutical and medical 11 (1.79%) 5 (2.44%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (3.85%) 0 (0.00%) 2 (1.94%)
Building materials 31 (5.03%) 4 (1.95%) 7 (6.73%) 9 (8.65%) 7 (7.00%) 4 (3.88%)
Rubber and plastics 41 (6.66%) 19 (9.27%) 3 (2.88%) 3 (2.88%) 8 (8.00%) 8 (7.77%)
Metal, mechanical and
engineering
157 (25.49%) 19 (9.27%) 30 (28.85%) 37 (35.58%) 42 (42.00%) 29 (28.16%)
Electronics and electrical 81 (13.15%) 28 (13.66%) 10 (9.62%) 12 (11.54%) 11 (11.00%) 20 (19.42%)
Textiles and apparel 110 (17.86%) 73 (35.61%) 15 (14.42%) 4 (3.85%) 10 (10.00%) 8 (7.77%)
Toys 8 (1.30%) 8 (3.90%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
Jewelry 3 (0.49%) 2 (0.98%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (0.97%)
Arts and crafts 12 (1.95%) 1 (0.49%) 4 (3.85%) 5 (4.81%) 1 (1.00%) 1 (0.97%)
Publishing and printing 27 (4.38%) 5 (2.44%) 2 (1.92%) 10 (9.62%) 7 (7.00%) 3 (2.91%)
Sales Total
(n = 587)
Hong Kong
(n = 176)
Guangzhou
(n = 104)
Chongqing
(n = 104)
Shanghai
(n = 100)
Tianjin
(n = 103)
<HK $5 m 190 (32.37%) 16(9.09%) 51 (49.04%) 35 (33.65%) 30 (30.00%) 58 (56.31%)
HK $5 m to <$10 m 83 (14.14%) 16(9.09%) 19 (18.27%) 13 (12.50%) 16 (16.00%) 19 (18.45%)
HK $10 m to <$20 m 73 (12.44%) 27(15.34%) 5 (4.81%) 20 (19.23%) 12 (12.00%) 9 (8.74%)
HK $20 m to <$50 m 93 (15.84%) 39(22.16%) 13 (12.50%) 17 (16.35%) 15 (15.00%) 9 (8.74%)
HK $50 m to <$100 m 60 (10.22%) 24(13.64%) 10 (9.62%) 8 (7.69%) 15 (15.00%) 3 (2.91%)
HK $100 m or more 88 (14.99%) 54(30.68%) 6 (5.77%) 11 (10.58%) 12 (12.00%) 5 (4.85%)had fewer than 40 customers. This suggests that these
manufacturers primarily served business customers, not
final consumers. For half of the manufacturers, the
primary customer contributed at least 50% of their
sales. Thus, the primary customers are large. The meanTable 3
Basic information about customers
Number of
customers
Mean 176.79
Median 40.00
S.D. 506.267
Minimum 1.00
Maximum 7000.00
Percentiles
10 6.00
25 15.00
50 40.00
75 120.00
90 500.00
95 1000.00
Metal, mechanical and engineering 154.45
Electronics and electrical 233.21
Textiles and apparel 92.20
Other industries 206.79
Significance level 0.176number of years the average manufacturer has been
doing business with its primary customer was 10.7. This
reveals that the relationship between the manufacturer
and its primary customer is long-term and stable,
making it appropriate for studying normative andPercentage of sales to
primary customer (%)
Length of relationship with
primary customer (years)
50 10.66
50 10.00
25.6 7.950
2 1.00
100 65.00
15 3.00
30 5.00
50 10.00
70 15.00
80 20.00
90 25.00
52 10.97
51 9.60
50 11.64
50 10.41
0.859 0.327
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revealed no significant differences in the number of
customers, percent of sales to the primary customer or
relationship length across the industries, thus, it is
appropriate to analyze these relationships at the
aggregate level.
Since power and relationship commitment may
evolve with increasing relationship length, we also
tested the correlation between relationship length,
dimensions of power and types of relationship
commitment. The correlation between relationship
length, type of relationship commitment and referent,
reward or coercive power was not significant. The
correlations between relationship length and expert and
legitimate power were quite low, although they were
statistically significant. Thus, sample bias due to the
length of the relationship is not a problem. Furthermore,
we found that number of customers and the primary
customer’s contribution to the manufacturer’s sales
were not related to any of the dimensions of power or
relationship commitment. These findings further justify
the stability and robustness of the power and relation-
ship commitment constructs. ANOVA revealed no
significant differences in the constructs between
industries. However, there were significant differences
between the northern cities (Tianjin and Chong Qing)
and southern cities (Guang Zhou, Shanghai and Hong
Kong) in some of the dimensions of power and
relationship commitment, most likely due to regional
differences in cultural, political and economical
environment. While regional differences contribute to
the variance in the sample, detailed examination of them
is beyond the scope of this study.
4.2. Measurement development
A rigorous process was used to develop and validate
the instrument, modeled on previous empirical studies
(Chen and Paulraj, 2004; Garver and Mentzer, 1999;
Min and Mentzer, 2004). Prior to data collection,
content validity was supported by previous literature,
executive interviews and pilot tests. After data
collection, we performed a series of analyses to test
the reliability and validity of the constructs.
4.2.1. Unidimensionality and reliability
A strict process for scale development was
employed, particularly since the scales were being
used in a very different national culture than the
Western culture in which they were developed. We
followed the two-step method used in Narasimhan and
Jayaram (1998) to test construct reliability, firstemploying exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to ensure
unidimensionality of the scales, then Cronbach’s alpha
for assessing reliability. EFA was used with principal
components analysis for data reduction and determining
the main constructs measured by the items. Varimax
rotation with Kaiser normalization was used to clarify
the factors (Loehlin, 1998). Some measurement items
were dropped after comparing their loading on the
construct that they were intended to measure to their
loadings on other constructs. Cronbach’s alpha was then
computed for each construct, to test for internal
consistency. Using the intercorrelation matrix, items
with a correlation value below the 0.30 cutoff value
were discarded (Flynn et al., 1994). These steps were
performed iteratively.
Because few studies about power have been
conducted in China, we investigated the dimensionality
of the power construct. EFA was conducted without
specifying the number of factors. The Eigenvalues for
the first four factors were above 1.0, and the Eigenvalue
for the fifth factor was slightly lower than 1.0, thus, four
or five factors could be extracted to represent the power
construct, which was supported by a scree plot. The
four-factor results were somewhat confusing because
the reward power items were split, with two loading on
the same factor as the items for legitimate power and the
other two loading on the same factor as the items for
coercive power, making them difficult conceptually
explain. Thus, the four-factor solution was discarded.
The five-factor solution was retained, and the results
were consistent with the five dimensions of power
identified in the literature (Table 4). Confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) was used to further justify the factor
structure. The model fit indices were x2(142) = 499.27,
RMSEA = 0.061, NNFI = 0.97, CFI = 0.98 and stan-
dardized RMR = 0.052, indicating that the model was
acceptable. These fit indices were better than those for
four-factor solution, providing further support that five
dimensions provide a good conceptualization of
customer power in China.
Because literature commonly divides power into
mediated and non-mediated sources, we tested a two-
factor solution using EFA. The factor loadings were
difficult to interpret, with the reward power items split
between both factors. We also conducted CFA accord-
ing to the mediated and non-mediated dichotomy. The
fit indices indicated that this model was not acceptable,
with NNFI = 0.86 and CFI = 0.88. Thus, we did not find
evidence to collapse the five dimensions into the two
dimensions often used in the Western literature.
The final results of the factor analysis are shown in
Tables 4 and 5. The measurement items all had strong
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Table 4
Factor analysis of power
Factor loadings
Coercive power Legitimate power Expert power Referent power Reward power
COE2 0.901 0.096 0.012 0.070 0.125
COE4 0.870 0.106 0.019 0.059 0.143
COE3 0.862 0.142 0.043 0.024 0.227
COE1 0.827 0.087 0.044 0.073 0.204
LEG1 0.076 0.777 0.238 0.136 0.112
LEG2 0.118 0.773 0.115 0.184 0.145
LEG3 0.107 0.725 0.215 0.155 0.158
LEG4 0.117 0.697 0.118 0.046 0.367
EXP2 0.019 0.099 0.806 0.196 0.169
EXP1 0.026 0.177 0.787 0.104 0.126
EXP3 0.102 0.119 0.777 0.271 0.102
EXP4 0.160 0.301 0.616 0.164 0.088
REF2 0.099 0.162 0.199 0.858 0.166
REF1 0.062 0.135 0.248 0.826 0.153
REF3 0.067 0.204 0.241 0.799 0.159
REW2 0.212 0.290 0.161 0.151 0.767
REW3 0.186 0.261 0.277 0.158 0.738
REW4 0.347 0.081 0.161 0.220 0.645
REW1 0.308 0.439 0.018 0.159 0.589
Eigenvalue 3.389 2.843 2.675 2.420 2.357
Total variance explained 72.018%loadings on the construct that they were supposed to
measure and lower loadings on the constructs that they
were not supposed to measure, indicating unidimen-
sionality. The Cronbach’s alpha values were all above
0.80 (Table 6), except instrumental relationship
commitment, which had an alpha value of 0.67. This
was above the lower limit of 0.60 suggested by Flynn
et al. (1990) and Nunnally (1994) for newly developed
scales. Although this scale had been used in Western
countries previously (Brown et al., 1995), it is a new
scale in China. Thus, we applied the criterion for newly
developed scales.
4.2.2. Construct validity
We constructed a CFA model to assess convergent
and divergent validity (O’Leary-Kelly and Vokurka,
1998). Each item was linked to its corresponding
construct, with the covariances freely estimated. The
model fit indices were x2 = 2558.80 with d.f. = 674,
RMSEA = 0.070, NNFI = 0.94, CFI = 0.95 and stan-
dardized RMR = 0.059, indicating that the model was
acceptable (Hu et al., 1992). All factor loadings were
greater than 0.50 and all t-values were greater than 2.0
(Chau, 1997; Fornell and Larcker, 1981), therefore,
convergent validity was demonstrated. To assess
discriminant validity, we built a constrained CFA
model in which the correlation between each possiblepair of constructs were fixed to 1. This was compared
with the original unconstrained model, in which the
correlations were freely estimated. Only two differ-
ences of x2 were insignificant at the 0.001 level,
therefore, discriminant validity was demonstrated.
4.3. Structural equation modeling and results
We used structural equation modeling (SEM) to
estimate the causal relationship among the constructs.
A two-stepmodel building approach was used, with the
measurement models tested prior to testing the
structural model (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988;
Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993). Themaximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) method was used because it has
desirable asymptotic properties (e.g., minimum var-
iance and unbiasedness) and is scale-free. Multivariate
normality (Raykov and Marcoulides, 2000) was
verified using univariate Q–Q plots. The structural
model was built on the modified measurement
model using the MLE method. The goodness of fit
indices were x2 = 2622.14 with d.f. = 680, RMSEA =
0.071, NNFI = 0.94, CFI = 0.95, and standardized
RMR = 0.068, which are better than the threshold
values suggested by Hu et al. (1992). Therefore, our
model can be accepted. Fig. 3 shows the structural
equation model and the standardized coefficients for
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Table 5
Factor analysis of relationship commitment and customer integration
Factor loadings
Customer integration Normative relationship commitment Instrumental relationship commitment
CI10 0.769 0.072 0.057
CI3 0.757 0.101 0.008
CI11 0.756 0.133 0.086
CI8 0.747 0.109 0.155
CI9 0.733 0.204 0.168
CI4 0.677 0.254 0.058
CI5 0.667 0.199 0.106
CI7 0.666 0.219 0.030
CI6 0.639 0.144 0.091
CI2 0.636 0.020 0.112
CI1 0.633 0.011 0.126
NRC4 0.147 0.849 0.161
NRC5 0.131 0.845 0.146
NRC3 0.147 0.814 0.115
NRC6 0.182 0.764 0.210
NRC1 0.156 0.745 0.057
NRC2 0.148 0.718 0.063
IRC2 0.035 0.159 0.824
IRC1 0.133 0.026 0.788
IRC3 0.007 0.150 0.629
Eigenvalue 5.551 4.061 1.921
Total variance explained 57.666%
Table 6
Reliability analysis
Construct No. of
items
Cronbach’s
alpha
Expert power 4 0.813
Referent power 3 0.875
Legitimate power 4 0.825
Reward power 4 0.831
Coercive power 4 0.915
Normative relationship commitment 6 0.897
Instrumental relationship commitment 3 0.667
Customer integration 11 0.900the paths that were significant at the 0.05 level. The
results of hypotheses tests are presented in Table 7.
5. Discussion and managerial implications
5.1. Power–relationship commitment theory in
China
Our findings provide insight into the mechanisms of
power–relationship commitment theory in China from a
SC perspective. Fig. 3 reveals that expert and referent
power had a positive impact on normative relationship
commitment, indicating that customers’ use of non-mediated power enhanced the manufacturer’s commit-
ment, supporting H1a, and H1b. The influence of
legitimate power on normative relationship commit-
ment was insignificant, and H3c was not supported.
Expert, referent and legitimate power had no impact on
instrumental relationship commitment, which does not
support the hypothesized negative relationship between
non-mediated sources of power and instrumental
relationship commitment; however, this is consistent
with Brown et al.’s (1995) findings.
These findings provide insight into power–relation-
ship commitment theory in China. Expert and referent
power were related to normative relationship commit-
ment, but not to instrumental relationship commitment.
In other words, although the expert and referent power
of customers enhances manufacturers’ commitment
normatively, they do not choose to exercise it in an
instrumental way. When a manufacturer accepts its
customer’s influence because of the customer’s specia-
lized knowledge and expertise or good reputation, it
learns from the customer. This fosters identification
with and internalization of the customer’s values and
norms, enhancing normative relationship commitment,
but does not significantly influence instrumental
relationship commitment. The impact of expert power
on normative relationship commitment indicates that
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Fig. 3. Structural equation model.Chinese managers have a strong belief in knowledge
and authority, combined with a powerful desire to learn.
Legitimate power was not significantly related to
either type of relationship commitment. There are
several potential explanations for this. First, the
customer’s natural right to influence a manufacturer
is universally accepted in China, so this source of power
is not related to any unique characteristic of theTable 7
Results of hypothesis tests
Hypothesis
H1a: A supplier’s normative relationship commitment will be positively re
power of its customer
H1b: A supplier’s normative relationship commitment will be positively re
power of its customer
H1c: A supplier’s normative relationship commitment will be positively re
power of its customer
H1d: A supplier’s normative relationship commitment will be negatively r
power of its customer
H1e: A supplier’s normative relationship commitment will be negatively re
power of its customer
H2a: A supplier’s instrumental relationship commitment will be negatively
power of its customer
H2a: A supplier’s instrumental relationship commitment will be negatively
power of its customer
H2a: A supplier’s instrumental relationship commitment will be negatively
power of its customer
H2a: A supplier’s instrumental relationship commitment will be positively
power of its customer
H2a: A supplier’s instrumental relationship commitment will be positively
power of its customer
H3a: The degree of integration between a supplier and a customer will be
relationship commitment
H3b: The degree of integration between a supplier and a customer will be
relationship commitment
H3c: Normative relationship commitment by the supplier will have a stron
instrumental relationship commitmentcustomer. Although legitimate power is strong, it is
pervasive and does not particularly influence relation-
ship commitment. Second, China’s collective culture,
combined with the existence of guanxi networks, causes
the power base to shift from natural rights of the
customer to in-group versus out-group differences in the
extended network. Customers are not perceived as
having power by natural right; rather, the perception of
power derives from whether the customer is in the in-
group in the extended guanxi network. The influence of
a customer, merely by virtue of being a customer, is not
significant.
The path coefficients in Fig. 3 show that customers’
reward power had a relatively high impact on both
normative and instrumental relationship commitment;
thus H1d was not supported, but H2d was. Coercive
power had a positive impact on instrumental relation-
ship commitment, but a negative impact on normative
relationship commitment, thus supporting both H1e and
H2e. As predicted, coercion plays a significant role in
instrumental relationship commitment, but is associated
with lower levels of normative relationship commit-
ment.
It is interesting that coercive power had a negative
impact on normative relationship commitment, whileOutcome
lated to its perception of the expert Supported
lated to its perception of the referent Supported
lated to its perception of the legitimate Rejected
elated to its perception of the reward Rejected
lated to its perception of the coercive Supported
related to its perception of the expert Rejected
related to its perception of the referent Rejected
related to its perception of the legitimate Rejected
related to its perception of the reward Supported
related to its perception of the coercive Supported
positively related to the supplier’s normative Supported
negatively related to the supplier’s instrumental Rejected
ger impact on customer integration than Supported
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reward and coercive power are classified as ‘‘mediated’’
sources of power in the Western literature (Brown et al.,
1995). This may reflect the Chinese tendency to use
positive feedback to encourage others to commit to their
values and norms, while using negative feedback to
regulate and manage calculative relationships. The
positive relationship between reward power and
normative relationship commitment contradicts Brown
et al.’s (1995) findings, which may be due to cultural
differences (Hofstede, 1983, 1984). In the Chinese high
power distance culture, as in the West, reward power
brings the instrumental relationship commitment of the
partners. However, it also improves normative relation-
ship commitment. Due to the existence of guanxi in
business relationships, manufacturers expect preferen-
tial treatment from customers in exchange for favors
and obligations (Lee et al., 2001). Because reciproca-
tion of a favor as soon as the opportunity arises is a
morally binding social norm (Lee and Dawes, 2005),
not returning a favor results in loss of face for both the
manager and his in-group. Therefore, if the customer
does not reward the manufacturer for the good
performance or favors it delivered, the customer’s trust
and normative relationship commitment will decrease.
In contrast, when the customer uses reward power to
meet the manufacturer’s expectation of reciprocity,
normative relationship commitment is further
enhanced. Therefore, reward power plays a very
different role in Chinese culture, compared with
Western cultures. This was supported by our explora-
tory analysis of the two factor solution, which where the
loadings for reward power were split between the
factors for mediated and nonmediated power. Under-
standing the role of reward power in China further
develops power–relationship commitment theory. To
confirm our findings, future cross-cultural studies
should be carried out to further explore configural
and structural differences in the relationship between
power and relationship commitment in a SC context.
Understanding the development of power–relation-
ship commitment in China is helpful for practitioners in
selecting strategies for dealing with their SC partners.
Because expert power was the most important in
improving normative relationship commitment, custo-
mers should strive to hire knowledgeable people and
manage their expertise and skills. Referent power was
the next most important. Customers should refrain from
the use of coercive power, because it enhances the
manufacturer’s instrumental relationship commitment,
while reducing its normative relationship commitment.
Reward power should be used cautiously because it maylead to different outcomes in China. SC partners should
develop an understanding of the effect of different types
of power, and should selectively exercise their power, in
order to enhance relationship commitment.
5.2. The effect of relationship commitment on SCI
This study also investigated the link between power–
relationship commitment theory and customer integra-
tion in Chinese supply chains. The path coefficients in
Fig. 3 show that normative relationship commitment
had a very strong positive impact on CI, supporting H3a.
However, the coefficient for the path from instrumental
relationship commitment to CI was not significant and
did not support H3b. This is consistent with Gounaris’
(2005) finding that instrumental relationship had no
impact on customer retention or investment intention.
Comparing the equal coefficients constrained model
with the unconstrained model, we found that the two
coefficients were significantly different from each other,
indicating support for H3c. However, there was a
significant difference between normative and instru-
mental relationship commitment in enhancing CI. Since
integration requires transaction-specific asset invest-
ment, partners should strive for a longer-term orienta-
tion, as well as congruence in their values, norms of
behavior and managerial approaches.
Manufacturers should cultivate normative relation-
ship commitment with their customers, in order to
enhance integration. Committed customers cooperate
with manufacturers, sharing information and integrat-
ing inter-organizational processes. When partners have
an intrinsic desire to continue a relationship due to
congruence in values and norms, CI can be achieved
more readily. In contrast, instrumental relationship
commitment does not have any significant influence on
CI, due to its short-term and loose nature. Therefore,
manufacturers should refrain from cultivating instru-
mental relationship commitment because it has no
effect on CI and may actually damage shared values and
norms in the long term.
6. Conclusions and limitations
We have provided a holistic perspective of customer
integration by employing both transaction cost theory
and social exchange theory, and investigated the impact
of power and relationship commitment on CI, using
power–relationship commitment theory. Our study is
the first to study these relationships using data collected
from manufacturers in China. Because of China’s
rapidly growing manufacturing base and unique
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rial implications for both SC practitioners and
researchers.
This study makes a significant contribution to the
SCM and relationship management literature by system-
atically examining the influence of power on relationship
commitment in a SC context. Overall, the results show
that appropriate use of power can significantly enhance
relationship commitment. Improvement in relationship
commitment, especially normative relationship commit-
ment, improves CI, while reducing transaction costs and
opportunistic behaviors.
This study shows that power and relationship
commitment are especially important for CI, due to
China’s collective and high power distance culture and
the existence of guanxi networks in SC relationships.
Some of the relationships between power and relation-
ship commitment in China are different from those
reported by Brown et al.’s (1995) U.S.-based study.
While Brown et al. (1995) reported that mediated
power had a negative impact on normative relationship
commitment, we found that reward power had a
positive impact on both normative and instrumental
relationship commitment in China. We speculate that
these differences might be caused by the differences in
national culture between China and the U.S. This study
justifies and extends power–relationship commitment
theory, established in Western marketing channel
literature, to Chinese culture and supply chain
management.
These findings provide guidelines for managers in
developing power in SC relationships. Our model
demonstrates that normative relationship commitment
is strongly related to CI, clearly showing the importance
of managing SC relationships. Thus, this study
establishes a link between power–relationship commit-
ment theory and SCI.
Although this study makes significant contributions
to both academia and practice, there are several
limitations which open up venues for further research.
First, besides power and relationship commitment,
many other factors, such as competitive hostility,
environmental uncertainty and other inter-organiza-
tional relationships (e.g. transaction-specific assets,
dependence, trust), may also influence CI and relation-
ship commitment. Future studies should seek addi-
tional drivers of CI and examine their impact. Second,
the impact of industry and region were not explicitly
investigated in this study. In some industries or regions,
the relationship between power, relationship commit-
ment and SC integration may be different, due to
differences in customer requirements and preferences.Third, we only used data fromChina to develop and test
the model. Although instrumental relationship com-
mitment had an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha, it was
relatively low. Future studies should further develop
this construct, to provide a deeper understanding of it in
China. Because culture may have a significant
influence on the conceptualization of power and
relationship commitment and their interrelationship,
future studies should examine configural and structural
differences in these constructs and their relationship in
different cultures. Fourth, we examined the relation-
ship between manufacturers and their primary custo-
mers. We did not examine the types of customer
companies (retailers, distributors, manufacturers) and
their power position relative to the manufacturers,
which provides another opportunity for future research.
Furthermore, this study only examined sources of
customer power from the perspective of the manu-
facturer. Future studies should collect the perspectives
of both manufacturers and customers, which may shed
new light on the relationship between power and
relationship commitment. Finally, this study only
examined dyadic relationships between manufacturers
and their customers. To understand the entire SC, future
studies should examine power and relationship
commitment among suppliers, manufacturers and
customers together. Examination of triadic relation-
ships will reveal more complex dynamic relationships
among them.
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Appendix A. Construct measurement
A.1. Customer integration (selected from
Narasimhan and Kim, 2002; Frohlich and
Westbrook, 2001)
Please indicate the extent of integration or informa-
tion sharing between your organization and your major
customer in the following areas (1 = not at all;
7 = extensive). CI1: The level of linkage with major customer
through information network. CI2: The level of computerization for our major
customer ordering.
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our major customer. CI4: The level of communication with our major
customer. CI5: The establishment of quick ordering system with
our major customer. CI6: Follow-up with our major customer for feed-
back. CI7: The frequency of periodical contacts with our
major customer. CI8: Our major customer shares point of sales (POS)
information with us. CI9: Our major customer shares demand forecast with
us. CI10: We share our available inventory with our
major customer. CI11: We share our production plan with our major
customer.A.2. Relationship commitment (adapted from
Brown et al., 1995)
The following statements are about you and your
major customer concerning relationship. Please indicate
the degree of agreement that you have with each
statement. (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
A.2.1. Normative relationship commitment
 NRC1: We feel that our major customer views us as
being an important ‘‘team members,’’ rather than our
being just another supplier. NRC2: We are proud to tell others that we are a
supplier for this customer. NRC3: Our attachment to this customer is primarily
based on the similarity of our values and those of this
customer. NRC4: The reason we prefer this customer to others is
because of what it stands for, its values. NRC5: During the past year, our company’s values
and those of the major customer have become more
similar. NRC6: What this customer stands for is important to
our company.A.2.2. Instrumental relationship commitment
 IRC1: Unless we are rewarded for it in some way, we
see no reason to expend extra effort on behalf of this
customer. IRC2: How hard we work for this major customer is
directly linked to how much we are rewarded. IRC3: Bargaining is necessary in order to obtain
favorable terms of SC in dealing with this customer.A.3. Power (adapted from Brown et al., 1995)
The following statements are about you and your
major customer concerning power. Please indicate the
degree of agreement that you have with each statement
(1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
A.3.1. Expert power
 EXP1: The people in the customer’s organization
knew what they are doing. EXP2: We usually got good advice from our major
customer. EXP3: The customer had specially trained people
who really knew what had to be done. EXP4: Our major customer’s business expertise made
them likely to suggest the proper thing to do.
A.3.2. Referent power
 REF1: We really admire the way our major customer
runs their business, so we tried to follow their
lead. REF2: We generally wanted to operate our company
very similar to the way we thought the major
customer would. REF3: Our company did what the customer wanted
because we have very similar feelings about the way a
business should be run.
A.3.3. Legitimate power
 LEG1: It was our duty to do as the major customer
requested. LEG2: We had an obligation to do what the major
customer wanted, even though it wasn’t a part of the
contract. LEG3: Since they were the customer, we accepted
their recommendations. LEG4: The major customer had the right to expect us
to go along with their request.
A.3.4. Reward power
 REW1: If we did not do what as the major customer
asked, we would not have received very good
treatment from them. REW2: We felt that by going along with the major
customer, we would have been favored on some other
occasions. REW3: By going along with the major customer’s
requests, we avoided some of the problems other
suppliers face. REW4: Our major customer often rewarded us to get
our company to go along with their wishes.
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 COE1: The major customer’s personnel would
somehow get back at us if we did not do as they
asked and they would have found out. COE2: The major customer often hinted that they
would take certain actions that would reduce our
profits if we did not go along with their requests. COE3: The major customer might have withdrawn
certain needed services from us if we did not go along
with them. COE4: If our company did not agree to their
suggestions, the major customer could have made
things more difficult for us.
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